The recognition of hierarchical structure in human behavior was one of the founding insights of the cognitive revolution. Despite decades of research, however, the computational mechanisms underlying hierarchically organized behavior are still not fully understood. Recent findings from behavioral and neuroscientific research have fueled a resurgence of interest in the problem, inspiring a new generation of computational models. In addition to developing some classic proposals, these models also break fresh ground, teasing apart different forms of hierarchical structure, placing a new focus on the issue of learning, and addressing recent findings concerning the representation of behavioral hierarchies within the prefrontal cortex. While offering explanations for some key aspects of behavior and functional neuroanatomy, the latest models also pose new questions for empirical research. and perhaps most strikingly in neuroscience 8, 9 .
In 1951, Karl Lashley 1 delivered an address that did much to catalyze the cognitive revolution in psychology. Lashley's key assertion was that sequential behavior cannot be understood as a chain of stimulus-response associations. Instead, he argued, behavior displays hierarchical structure, comprising nested subroutines. A few years later, another key event in the shift to cognitivism occurred, with the publication of Plans and the Structure of Behavior, by Miller, Galanter and Pribram. 2 Once again, the theme was hierarchical structure in human action.
While the issue of hierarchy was central to the birth of cognitivism, it was also central to the birth of computational modeling as a tool in psychology. A critical contribution of the Miller, Galanter and Pribram book was to propose one of the first computer-inspired models of cognition. In the decades since this pioneering work, a considerable number of computational models have been proposed to account for hierarchical structure in human behavior (Box 1). While interest in the topic has been steady among modelers, recent developments have begun to push hierarchy back toward center stage of empirical research, as well. In particular, a renewed focus on hierarchical structure in behavior has appeared in cognitive psychology, 3, 4 developmental psychology, 5, 6 neuropsychology, 7 and perhaps most strikingly in neuroscience 8, 9 .
Amid this resurgence of interest, a new generation of computational models has appeared. As reviewed in what follows these models, as a group, develop some key earlier proposals, while at the same time addressing some important new considerations.
BOX 1 AROUND HERE Two Kinds of Hierarchical Structure
Descriptions of human behavior as hierarchical have rarely been accompanied by precise technical or operational definitions. Nevertheless, the basic idea is clear enough: The sequences or streams of action that humans produce can be analyzed into coherent subunits or parts. 10 Though it has not always been explicit, the nature of these parts, and of the wholes into which they form, has been understood in two ways, depending on whether the focus is on the instrumental structure of behavior, or its correlational structure.
Human behavior displays instrumental structure in the sense that action sequences bring about valued or desired outcomes, and successive actions fit together through means-ends relationships, with earlier actions setting up the conditions necessary for later ones. As an illustration of how instrumental structure can give rise to hierarchy, consider the simple action sequence outlined in Figure 1a . The arrows in the figure indicate meansends links, where one action is performed in order to allow performance of another.
Actions in red accomplish components of the overall goal of the sequence. In figure 1b , the same sequence is redrawn to highlight the presence of part-whole structure. As indicated by the overlay, actions within the sequence can be grouped into two sets, each accomplishing a component of the overall goal. Smaller subunits can be identified within these large ones, as well, for example the sequence accomplishing the subgoal of opening the door. This nesting of parts defines a hierarchy, as diagrammed in Figure 1c .
FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE
Hierarchical organization can alternatively be seen as a function of action's correlational structure. Here, coherent subunits are defined not by means-ends relationships, but by statistical co-occurrence, both among actions and between actions and environmental contexts. To return to our example, the actions get-key, unlock-door, and open-door are liable to occur together not only in the context of placing money in a safe, but also in the contexts of removing money, depositing or removing other items, or checking the safe's contents. As a result, the actions within this subsequence share stronger statistical associations with one another than they do with actions outside the sequence's boundaries. The actions within the sequence are also bound by a common association with the condition door-closed.
Note that correlational relations, like instrumental relations, can be nested or recursive.
Thus, when the door-opening sequence is preceded by picking up money, the two together predict placing the money inside the safe. The overall sequence from picking up the money to depositing it thus forms a coherent subunit, which subsumes the dooropening sequence. Once again, recursive part-whole relationships yield a hierarchical structure.
Clearly, there is a close relationship between correlational and instrumental organization.
Nevertheless, the distinction is important. Empirical work indicates that both forms of structure separately impact event memory, parsing and imitation. 5, 10-13 Despite such evidence, hierarchical models of action production have tended until recently to neglect the distinction between instrumental and correlational structure, a point that provides an important piece of the background for understanding recent developments and current challenges.
Computational Fundamentals
All existing models of hierarchically structured behavior share at least one general assumption, which is that the hierarchical, part-whole organization of human action is mirrored in the internal or neural representations underlying it. Specifically, the assumption is that there exist representations not only of low-level motor behaviors, but also While the above are the basic elements shared by existing models of hierarchical behavior, there is wide variation in the ways that these elements are cashed out in different models, as detailed in the following sections.
Recent Models of Hierarchically Structured Behavior
Perhaps the most extensively developed recent model of hierarchical behavior has been put forth by Cooper and Shallice. [15] [16] [17] This model carries forward an approach with a long tradition (Box 1), according to which it is assumed that the processing system has a hierarchical architecture that maps directly onto the structure of the relevant task domain.
Cooper and Shallice [15] [16] [17] [18] begin by conceptualizing hierarchically structured tasks in the form of tree structures like the one shown in Figure 1c , and then build models that contain a simple connectionist processing unit, or "schema node," for every element in the tree. Figure 2a shows one such model, which implements the task of coffee-making. input from perceptual inputs. Top-down input to each unit is also gated by a "goal node,"
which prevents top-down excitation from activating any action whose outcome has already occurred (for example, top-down excitation to the action empty-spoon is gated if the spoon is already empty). Performance of the task is simulated by assigning a positive activation to the top-level schema node and applying external inputs representing the initial state of the environment. Figure 2b illustrates the operation of the model by plotting the activation of each schema node over cycles of processing. In addition to providing a basic account of hierarchical action production, the Cooper and Shallice model has been used to account for detailed empirical findings concerning performance errors in apraxia 7, 19 and everyday 'slips of action'. [15] [16] [17] FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE An alternative computational account, which addresses some of the same data, was put forth by Botvinick and Plaut. [20] [21] [22] Picking up on earlier work by Elman 23 and Cleeremans 24 (Box 1), this model does not assume a constitutively hierarchical processing system. Instead, all that is assumed is a set of processing units representing perceptual inputs, a set of units representing actions, and an interposed set of hidden or internal units ( Figure 2c ). A critical feature of the model is that its internal units are interconnected. This allows information to be preserved and transformed over time, in the pattern of activation over these units. Botvinick and Plaut 21 applied this model to the coffee-making task addressed by Cooper and Shallice, 15 demonstrating its ability to negotiate this hierarchically structured domain. Rather than relying on an explicitly hierarchical architecture, the model learned to represent the task's layers of structure within the distributed patterns of activation arising over its internal units ( Figure 1d ).
The hierarchical structure of the task was encoded implicitly in its internal representations and dynamics, as shaped through domain-general learning mechanisms, rather than being explicitly mirrored, in a one-to-one fashion, by the system's basic elements.
Comparing habit system based on context-response associations and a goal-directed system operating through the anticipation of action outcomes. 26, 27 Botvinick and Plaut 22 suggest that, in humans, both of these systems may be capable of encoding hierarchical structure, but may encode it differently, with the habit system capturing correlational structure and the goal-directed system capturing instrumental structure.
Another important difference between the models proposed by Botvinick and Plaut and by Cooper and Shallice is that the former includes a fully implemented account of learning. While this is a relative strength, O'Reilly and Frank 14 have called attention to slow rate at which hierarchical task structure can be learned within recurrent networks of kind studied by Botvinick and Plaut. In particular, although such networks can support the robust maintenance necessary for hierarchical behavior, this functionality is acquired only with great difficulty. As an alternative, O'Reilly and Frank 14 put forth a biologically-inspired model that learns, through reinforcement-based mechanisms, to gate context information into a dedicated working-memory buffer. Importantly, this buffer, which models the role of prefrontal cortex, contains multiple independently gated subunits or "stripes," allowing the model to negotiate tasks with multiple, hierarchical levels of structure (see Figure 4d ).
Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning
The work of O'Reilly and Frank 14 is representative of an emerging focus, within research on hierarchically structured behavior, on the issue of learning. In an interesting parallel development, the potential role of hierarchy has taken on increasing interest within the field of machine learning, and in particular in research on reinforcement learning. As explained in Box 2, hierarchical methods for reinforcement learning provide a powerful computational framework for understanding how abstract action representations might develop through experience, and also call attention to the role that such representations might play in supporting learning in novel task domains. As recently explored by Botvinick, Niv and Barto, 28 and further discussed in Box 2, hierarchical reinforcement learning may also shed light on the neural mechanisms underlying hierarchically structured behavior in humans.
BOX 2 AROUND HERE Hierarchical Structure in Prefrontal Cortex
The neural mechanisms underlying the production of hierarchically organized behavior have long been considered to reside, at least in part, within the dorsolateral prefrontal Still other data point to the potential relevance of another form of abstraction. Christoff and colleagues 41 observed a rostral shift in prefrontal activation as subjects performed a task that required them to process words naming increasingly abstract concepts. Such a finding may appear incommensurable with the notion that the prefrontal hierarchy is organized according to levels of temporal or policy abstraction. However, it has been noted in work on computational reinforcement learning that there is a natural relationship between temporal or policy abstraction and state abstraction, the treatment of nonidentical stimuli or situations as equivalent.
42, 43
It is often the case that the successful performance of temporally extended tasks requires strict distinctions concerning some aspects of current inputs (e.g., in reading, what are the letters?) while allowing one to ignore or 'abstract over' others (what is the font?). 44 State abstraction, in this sense, bears a close logical relationship with category representation, 45 a point that may provide a clue as to why evidence has emerged for prefrontal organization both in terms of temporal grain and in terms of semantic category.
Conclusion
Computational modeling of hierarchically structured behavior, once at the center of the cognitive revolution, has been re-energized thanks to a new focus on hierarchy in behavioral, developmental and neuroscientific research. As reviewed here, recent models have elaborated on a number of earlier ideas but also added some new ones. In particular, there is an emerging focus on how hierarchical action representations are learned and on how they affect learning; a growing cognizance of the distinction between correlational and instrumental structure, and of the parallel between this distinction and the one between habitual and goal-directed forms of action control; and, finally, a new effort to provide a computational account for the role of prefrontal cortex in hierarchically structured behavior. While the latest crop of models provides new insights, it also poses new or refined questions for empirical research, including questions about how abstract action representations emerge through learning, how they interact with different modes of action control, and how they sort out within the prefrontal cortex (Box 3). active, an option imposes its own option-specific policy, which can lead to selection of any combination of primitive actions and other options (Figure 3a) . HRL furnishes algorithms for learning an optimal policy given a set of options, as well as algorithms for learning optimal option-specific policies.
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The primary motivation for adding temporally abstract actions to RL is that they can dramatically facilitate learning. Figure 3b provides an illustration from Botvinick, Niv and Barto, 28 based on work by Sutton, Precup and Singh. 59 Here, learning to reach a goal in an environment divided into four rooms occurs faster when a basic set of primitive, single-step actions is supplemented with a set of four options, each of which defines a sub-policy for reaching one of the four doors. Critically, as shown by Botvinick, Niv and
Barto, 28 such a payoff accrues only if there is a good fit between the options available and the current learning task; an ill-suited set of options can actually slow learning. Thus, in HRL, a current challenge is to understand how learning across multiple problems might give rise to a set of options that is likely to be applicable in a wide range of future tasks.
57
Extensive evidence suggests that standard RL algorithms may be relevant to understanding learning mechanisms in the brain. 60, 61 In view of this, it is intriguing to consider whether HRL might have relevance to understanding the neural basis of 
